University of Wollongong

Research Online
Faculty of Engineering and Information
Sciences - Papers: Part B

Faculty of Engineering and Information
Sciences

2020

On Masking and Releasing Smart Meter Data at Micro-level: the
Multiplicative Noise Approach
John Brackenbury
P. Y. O'Shaughnessy
University of Wollongong, poshaugh@uow.edu.au

Yan-Xia Lin
University of Wollongong, yanxia@uow.edu.au

Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.uow.edu.au/eispapers1
Part of the Engineering Commons, and the Science and Technology Studies Commons

Recommended Citation
Brackenbury, John; O'Shaughnessy, P. Y.; and Lin, Yan-Xia, "On Masking and Releasing Smart Meter Data at
Micro-level: the Multiplicative Noise Approach" (2020). Faculty of Engineering and Information Sciences Papers: Part B. 4519.
https://ro.uow.edu.au/eispapers1/4519

Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information
contact the UOW Library: research-pubs@uow.edu.au

On Masking and Releasing Smart Meter Data at Micro-level: the Multiplicative
Noise Approach
Abstract
Smart meter electricity data presents privacy risks when malicious agents gain insights of private
information, including residents’ lifestyle and daily habits. When allowing access to record-level data, we
apply the multiplicative noise method to mask individual smart meter data, which simultaneously aims to
minimise disclosure of a dwelling’s consumption signal to any third party and to enable accurate
estimation of the sum of a cluster of households. Three testing criteria are introduced to measure the
performance of multiplicative noise masking approach relevant to the smart meter data. We propose a
novel ‘Twin Uniform’ noise distribution and derive relevant theoretical results. We then implement the
multiplicative noise approach in the real smart meter data from ESSnet Big Data. Results are assessed
based on privacy, utility and practicality. We conclude that the multiplicative noise method has
outstanding practical values. It preforms reasonably well in term of individual value protection and
estimation accuracy of the sum when noise distribution is carefully selected .

Keywords
multiplicative, noise, releasing, masking, smart, approach, meter, data, micro-level:

Disciplines
Engineering | Science and Technology Studies

Publication Details
Brackenbury, J., O'Shaughnessy, P. Y. & Lin, Y. (2020). On Masking and Releasing Smart Meter Data at
Micro-level: the Multiplicative Noise Approach. PSD2020 - Privacy in Statistical Databases (pp. 1-13).

This conference paper is available at Research Online: https://ro.uow.edu.au/eispapers1/4519

On Masking and Releasing Smart Meter Data at
Micro-level: the Multiplicative Noise Approach
John Brackenbury1,2 , P.Y. O’Shaughnessy1,3 , and Yan-Xia Lin1
1

School of Mathematics and Applied Statistics, University of Wollongong, Australia
2
jbrakenbury996@gmail.com
3
poshaugh@uow.edu.au

Abstract. Smart meter electricity data presents privacy risks when malicious agents gain insights of private information, including residents’
lifestyle and daily habits. When allowing access to record-level data, we
apply the multiplicative noise method to mask individual smart meter
data, which simultaneously aims to minimise disclosure of a dwelling’s
consumption signal to any third party and to enable accurate estimation of the sum of a cluster of households. Three testing criteria are
introduced to measure the performance of multiplicative noise masking
approach relevant to the smart meter data. We propose a novel ‘Twin
Uniform’ noise distribution and derive relevant theoretical results. We
then implement the multiplicative noise approach in the real smart meter data from ESSnet Big Data. Results are assessed based on privacy,
utility and practicality. We conclude that the multiplicative noise method
has outstanding practical values. It preforms reasonably well in term of
individual value protection and estimation accuracy of the sum when
noise distribution is carefully selected .
Keywords: Data protection · Statistical disclosure · Multiplicative noise
· Utility loss · Smart Meter data.
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Introduction

Whilst the rapid development in technology has created an entirely new
data industry in the past few decades, handling of data presents a privacy
concern for individuals. Notwithstanding the legal nuances of privacy policies, there is an expectation among data owners that their sensitive data
would be protected, including a level of anonymisation when transferring
control of data to third parties. The question of how to measure protection
procedures and assess data privacy is broad. Given the diversity of data
types and purposes, privacy metrics are often chosen according to application, making comparison across applications problematic. Thoughts
must always be given to the nature of what is being protected, and to the
means by which unauthorised agents may access such information [7].

One of the areas of application is the ‘smart meter’, which is an emerging technology in the energy industry. It records time-series electricity
consumption data in contrast to the conventional cumulation methodology. The meter transmits consumption figures automatically at regular
intervals, which has potential to revile residents living habit and poses
serious security concerns. In addition, the needs of energy providers must
also be considered for smart meter. For accurate billing, the total consumption over the billing period calculated from the altered time-series
must not deviate beyond a certain tolerance from the true total. When
the company intends to analyse network demand throughout the day,
such analysis will not be meaningful unless the deviation on each time
point is limited.
In 2010, Bohli, Sorge and Ugus published a paper specifically addressing the privacy concerns of smart meters [2]. Whilst recognising the needs
for individual billing and network demand, the authors emphasised that
the electricity suppliers operating the meters should also be kept from possessing sensitive data pertaining to individuals’ lifestyles. DiffeRentially
privatE smArt Metering (DREAM) was proposed [1] to protect data privacy for smart meters. Based on the concept of differential privacy, a
perturbative scheme is proposed that ensures the privacy of individual
time-series transmitted to an electricity supplier for aggregate demand
analysis at each time point. Each meter applies a Gamma noise to its
own signal, which becomes a Laplace noise when cumulated across the
cluster. Decryption keys is then used for protecting data transfer, and
the electricity supplier recieves a noisy sum from each cluster, with each
individual household differentially protected.
The existing DREAM method limits to query systems and is difficult
to offer detailed information on the household-level of electricity consumption. This means that electronic suppliers are unable to conduct further
analyses to gain statistical other insights as many advanced statistical
analyses require recorded-level data. Here we propose to use the multiplicative noise masking method, which allows releasing the record-level
information while protecting the privacy of smart meter data. Noise multiplication is a standard data masking method, but to the best of our
knowledge, it has not been implemented in the smart meter data, which
has its unique privacy requirements.
In this paper, we first give a brief description of the smart meter
dataset from European Statistical System and discuss the relevant testing
criteria specific for the smart meter data in Section 2. In Section 3, a novel
distribution is introduced for the multiplicative noise and an algorithm

specific for masking the smart meter data is proposed. Section 4 evaluates
the performance of the multiplicative noise techniques in three aspects
using the smart meter dataset and the conclusion is given in Section 5.
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Data Description and Testing Criteria

In this section, we describe a real dataset of smart electricity meter data,
and introduce the testing criteria for measuring the performance of the
masking technique. Smart Meter data is obtained from ESSnet Big Data4 ,
which is a current project within the European Statistical System (ESS).
The dataset consists of smart meter readings with various time interval
lengths between 2013 and 2015 recorded in Denmark and Estonia. We
select 4-day long hourly electricity consumption readings (T = 96 time
points) with entries measured in kilowatt-hours (kWh) from N = 3371
households for illustration in this paper.
Let Xt denote the smart meter readings at time t for t = 1, . . . , T .
More specifically, we assume that for i = 1, . . . , N , the smart meter readings for the ith household at time t, Xti , follows the same distribution
as Xt . The N households are separated into C clusters and each cluster
has nc households. We define St to be aggregated sum for a cluster of
smart meter readings at time t, which defines the underlying distribution
for Stc for c = 1, . . . , C. This data set is used to compare the utility and
protective efficacy of data-masking methods in the specific application
of protecting individual households’ electricity data. In particular, the
privacy requirements of Smart Meter data are to simultaneously
Pnc
i
1. enable accurate estimation of the sum Stc =
i=1 Xt for a defined
cluster of nc dwellings at each time t; and
2. protect individual value {Xti } from accurate estimation by the electricity suppliers.
Considering these two privacy requirements, we introduce three testing criteria for Smart Meter data. The first measure is an accuracy measure, namely, the probability of tolerable relative error
!
!
Ŝt − St
X̂t − Xt
pδ,S (t) = P
<δ ,
pδ,X (t) = P
<δ ,
St
Xt
where δ > 0 is the tolerance threshold, e.g. δ = 0.1 suggests a 10%
tolerance in differences between a masked value and its true value. We
4

See ebgate.ec.europa.eu/fpfis/mwikis/essnetbigdata/index.php/ESSnet Big Data
for more information.

denote Ŝt and X̂t as the estimated values for cluster sum at time t and
individual household at time t, respectively. The calculations of Ŝt and
X̂t vary according to the implemented data masking methods. Referred
to as the rate of error or accuracy rate, pδ in both cases are estimated by
the sample proportions

 c
C
1 X
ŝt − sct
p̂δ,S (t) =
<δ ,
I
C
sct
c=1

 i

N
1 X
x̂t − xit
p̂δ,X (t) =
I
<δ ,
N
xit
i=1

where I(·) is the indicator function and the lower cases x and x̂ are the
actualPobservations of variables X and X̂, respectively. The cluster sum
c
sct = ni=1
xit is the realizations of Stc . The estimated masked cluster sum
ŝct is similar. We use the accuracy measures pδ,S (t) and pδ,X (t) differently.
For estimation of the sum St , we wish high accuracy to maximise utility, corresponding to high pδ,S (t). For the individual household values Xt
we wish to maximise privacy and minimise malicious estimation accuracy, corresponding to low pδ,X (t). The latter is critical in measuring the
vulnerability of data masking methods.
The second and third measures used in this paper are mean relative
error (MRE) and mean unsigned relative error (MURE), namely
MRE =

C
1 X ŝct − sct
,
C
sct

MURE =

c=1

C
1 X ŝct − sct
.
C
sct
c=1

Different from the rate of error pδ,S , MRE and MURE quantify the overall
or average relative error across all clusters at a time t. Smaller value means
more accurate estimation of the sum.

3

The Multiplicative Noise Method

Noise multiplication or addition has a long history of being used for data
masking, mainly in official statistics and remote sensing imagery (see [4],
[5], [6], [3]). These two methods are similar in nature but each has quite
different privacy properties. [10] provided detailed review for both the
additive and multiplicative noise methods, and they pointed out that it
is difficult to generate the noise values under the additive noise method
given that the appropriate selection of noise distribution depends on the
original data values. By contrast the multiplicative noise method is able
to provide uniform record level protection in terms of noise coefficient of
variation to all values. The Smart Meter data has large variations among

electricity consumption values, thus we consider a multiplicative masking
technique for smart meter data, and then propose a novel distribution
appropriate for such noise to result in the greatest protective benefit.
Consider the aggregate sum of consumption from a group of nc households’ smart meters at each time t. The smart meter at each house records
its consumption levels as a regularly-spaced time-series, with the measurement from the ith node at time t denoted Xti . In general, the concept of
employing Multiplicative Noise is to simply calculate the perturbed values
X̃t , such that
X̃t = Xt × Mt ,
where Mt is a random variable sampled independently from a distribution
with mean µM and standard deviation σM for time t. Our goal is to
ensure that
electricity supplier is able to estimate the true cluster
Pthe
nc
c
sum St = i=1 Xti without disclosure of the individual household values
{Xti }, in order to protect the privacy of each household.
3.1

Shifting

Non-negativity in electricity consumption is valid, given current should
never flow in the opposite direction to ordinary power usage in Smart
Meter data. It is still possible for a zero value to occur from time to
time in real life. This creates two primary issues. First, from the practical
perspective of the simulation metrics, the relative error pδ does not exist
due to division by zero. This itself is not insurmountable, but it is desirable
to avoid it. The second issue is more serious: multiplicative noise applied
to a signal Xti = 0 causes no perturbation, thus the masking is nullified.
This poses a high disclosure risk for households with zero signals. Indeed,
given that zero signals are often a result of dwelling vacancy that persists
across many hours, even days, zero signal households must be protected.
[8] offered a solution to the zero signal issues by formulating a minor
modification to the scheme, referred to as shifting. The application of the
shifting approach can be found in [11]. The algorithm for applying the
multiplicative noise method to Smart Meter data is given as follows:
Algorithm: Multiplicative Noise with Shifting for masking Smart Meter data
1. Each node shifts their measurement by a value a, which is known
to the electricity suppliers :
Yt = Xt + a for a > 0.

2. Each node samples from the distribution M , multiplies:
Ỹt = Yt × Mt = (Xt + a)Mt .
3. The electricity suppliers receive noisy, shifted values {Ỹti }, and
aggregate
to
Pnc them
Pobtain
nc
c
i
(Xti + a)Mti .
S̃t = i=1 Ỹt = i=1
4. The electricity suppliers use the noise mean µM to obtain the
unbiased estimate for the cth cluster:
Pnc i
Pnc
(X i + a)Mti
S̃tc
c
i=1 Ỹt
Ŝt,M =
− nc a =
− nc a = i=1 t
− nc a .
µM
µM
µM

Here nc denotes the number of households in the cth cluster for c =
1, . . . , C. Note that some information about the noise distribution is generally available to electricity suppliers, e.g., the distribution mean, in
c .
order to use µM for the estimate Ŝt,M
We discuss this algorithm with respect to the two privacy requirements
listed in Sec. 2. Requirement 1 is about the estimation accuracy of the
sum, for which an unbiased sum estimate, Ŝtc , is defined, which needs to
de-scale and de-shift the perturbed sum S̃tc . It is unbiased in the following
sense:

nc 
N
X
X
E(Mti )
c
i
i
E(Ŝt,M |{Xt }) =
(Xt + a)
− nc a =
Xti + (nc a − nc a) = Stc ,
µM
i=1

i=1

c
satisfies two properties:
where E(Mti ) = µM . The sum estimate Ŝt,M

Property 1. Estimator Ŝtc is an unbiased estimator for the true sum Stc
given the true values {Xti }.
c
is
Property 2. The conditional standard error of the estimated sum Ŝt,M
qP

2
nc
i
i
{σM /µM }
i=1 Xt + a , given {Xt } values.
These properties imply that the electricity suppliers are able to unbiasedly
estimate the true cluster sum using Ŝtc (Property 1) with a known estimation error propotional to the true electricity consumption (Property
2).
For Privacy Requirement 2, we need to consider the how well the
individual value is protected. Given that noise mean µM and shifting
parameter a are known to electricity suppliers, it is possible for suppliers
to construct an unbiased estimator Ŷt,M = Ỹt /µM = (Yt Mt )/µM of Yt .

We are essentially comparing shifted estimate against shifted true value,
and this avoids division by zero as described above. The individual value
protection will be evaluated empirically in Sec. 4.
To the attentive reader, this may raise the question: So what are we
really protecting now, the true value Xt or the shifted true value Yt ? It
is true that since we apply an additive transformation to form Yt , the
relative error on the scale of Yt is not equal to the relative error on the
scale of Xt . Given the shifting value a is public knowledge, the argument
we make as resolution is that if the values Yt are sufficiently protected
(i.e. pδ,Y using Ŷt,M values is sufficiently low), then Xti is sufficiently
protected also. Conversely, if Yt is poorly protected and vulnerable to
disclosure, i.e. pδ,Y is high, then Xt is also vulnerable, since it can be
estimated accurately by a simple shift of an accurate estimate Ŷt,M .
3.2

Noise Distribution: Twin Uniform Distribution

Given that both perturbed values and the mean of the noise often are
known to the electricity supplier, the distribution of the multiplicative
noise plays an important role in protecting the values of the original
data. An obvious choice would be a simple uniform distribution. The
problem with the simple uniform distribution is that with a desired level of
accuracy in estimation of the sum, the range of the parameters (maximum
noise - minimum noise) need to be small, and as a result, the masked data
is not sufficiently different from the original values. Broadly speaking, we
need a distribution that is less distributed around the mean and also has
small variance.
Here we introduce the twin uniform distribution for a multiplicative
noise M , which has the following density
(
1
2µ(αmax −αmin ) , m ∈ A
fM (m) =
(1)
0,
else ,
where A = [µ(1 − αmax ), µ(1 − αmin )] ∪ [µ(1 + αmin ), µ(1 + αmax )] and we
denotes (1) as M ∼ TwinUnif(µ, αmin , αmax ). The twin uniform distribution is essentially a mixture distribution of the two uniform distributions
Unif(µ(1 − αmax ), µ(1 − αmin )) and Unif(µ(1 + αmin ), µ(1 + αmax )), mixed
with equal weight of probability (Fig. 1). The mean and variance for a
random noise M with TwinUnif(µ, αmin , αmax ) distribution are
E(M ) = µ

and

Var(M ) =

2
2 )
µ2 (αmax
+ αmax αmin + αmin
.
3

The distribution is relatively simple, making it feasible for implementation
in the inexpensive hardware of typical smart meters. When using a twin
uniform noise distribution, the conditional variance of the sum estimator
for a particular cluster of size nc (Property 2) is
c
Var(Ŝt,M
|{Xti }) =

nc
2
2
X
2
αmax
+ αmax αmin + αmin
Xti + a .
3

1

2µ(αmax − αmin)

Twin Uniform Noise Distribution

0

Probability Density fM(m)

i=1

µ(1 − αmax)

µ(1 − αmin)

µ

µ(1 + αmin)

µ(1 + αmax)

m

Fig. 1: Twin uniform distribution, showing the gap around the mean µ
that prevents accurate estimation of Xti by the electricity supplier.
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Results and Discussion

In this section, we evaluate the proposed multiplicative noise algorithm
with twin uniform noise distribution through three criteria, using the
ESSNET data described in Section 2. The cluster size is nc = 100 for
N = 3371 households with 96 hourly time points (4 days). We masked
Smart Meter data using a twin uniform distribution (1) with µ = 27
and setting the shift parameter a = 0.7. We discuss the performance of
the proposed multiplicative noise masking method with various parameter
values on three aspects relevant to the Smart Meter data, namely, privacy,
utility, and practicality.
4.1

Privacy

We firstly consider the probability of tolerable relative error for measuring
disclosure risk for individual data (Privacy Requirement 2, Sec. 2) for

Ŷt,M , the estimator of Yt . This is estimated by the sample proportion
p̂δ,Y , i.e.,
!
N
i
ŷt,M
− yti
1 X
p̂δ,Y (t) =
I
<δ .
N
yti
i=1
To ensure the privacy of individual data, it needs to satisfy p̂δ,Y (t) = 0 for
all t at given δ level. Theoretically, pδ,Y (αmin , αmax ) = (δ−αmin )/(αmax −
αmin ). This means that when taking αmin = δ, it guarantees that none
of the masked value will be close enough to the true value.
In addition to value disclosure, risks of the multiplicative noise scheme
may arise from other forms of estimation by malicious agents, for example, regression risk, which is the risk of improved estimation by fitting
a model to the received data Ỹt . This is measured by the correlation of
estimator Ŷt,M with true values Yt , corr(Ŷt,M , Yt ). [9] concluded that a
correlation below 0.8 shows large enough estimation uncertainty and is
considered reasonable protection for individual value against regression
risk. Choosing δ = αmin = 0.1 and ensuring p̂δ,Y (t) = 0 for all t, Fig. 2
displays the sample correlations across time when varying αmax . The results show that the correlations decreases (better protection) when αmax
increases (larger masking noise), and αmax ≥ 0.4 limits the correlations
approximately to 0.8, suggesting good individual value protection.

0.9
0.8
0.7

αmax = 0.1

0.6

^i
Correlation Coefficient: Corr (Yt, Yit)

TwinUnif: Simulated Correlations Across Time with Varying αmax

0

20
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αmax = 0.3

40

αmax = 0.4
60

Time(h)

αmax = 0.5
80

Note: αmin = 0.1, a = 0.6 in all cases.

Fig. 2: Correlations for the Multiplicative scheme, corr(Ŷt,M , Yt ).

4.2

Utility

The Smart Meter data also requires accurate estimation for the sum Stc =
P
nc
i
i=1 Xt over each cluster of dwellings (Privacy Requirement 1, Sec. 2).
The first measure is the probability of tolerable relative error for sum
estimation, pδ,S , which is estimated using the sample proportion, namely
p̂δ,S

 c

C
1 X
ŝt − sct
=
I
<δ .
C
sct
c=1

At a given level of δ, larger p̂δ,S indicates better utility, and perfect utility
has p̂δ,S = 1. Figure 3 suggests that multiplicative noise method achieves
reasonable accuracy rates with accuracy threshold δ = 0.1. As expected,
larger noise (αmax ) is associated with larger loss of utility. The cyclic
behaviour of the accuracy rate corresponds to the pattern in electricity
assumption, which again suggests a need for smaller αmax value for better
utility loss.

Proportion of Estimation within δ = 0.1 Relative Error
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0

TwinUnif: Simulated Estimation Error Levels Across Time with Varying αmax
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Note: αmin = 0.1, a = 0.6 in all cases.

Fig. 3: Simulated sum accuracy rates p̂δ with accuracy threshold δ = 0.1 with Multiplicative Noise (Twin Uniform).

The other measures of sum accuracy are the mean relative error
(MRE) and mean unsigned relative error (MURE),
MRE =

C
1 X ŝct − sct
,
C
sct
c=1

MURE =

C
1 X ŝct − sct
,
C
sct
c=1

where the sums are taken over all clusters c = 1, . . . , C at each time
t. As explained in Section 2, distinct from the rate of error pδ,S , both
MRE and MURE measure an average relative error. Here we focus on the
MRE measure, which includes both overestimation and underestimation,
the errors of opposite sign offset each other. MURE sums the absolute
differences but shows similar result to MRE. The result of MURE is
available upon request.
Figure 4 plots MRE for multiplicative noise scheme across time. Similar to the accuracy rates p̂δ,S , MRE is larger for masking scheme with
larger αmax . The cyclic pattern is less obvious comparing to the accuracy
rates, although one can observe large relative errors at several time points.
It again suggests that the utility loss is associated with true electricity
assumption volume.
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Mean Relative Error
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TwinUnif: Simulated Mean Relative Error Across Time with Varying αmax
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Fig. 4: Simulated mean relative error (MRE) across time with Multiplicative Noise
(Twin Uniform).

4.3

Practicality

Beyond the numerical properties of privacy and utility, there are other
characteristics to factor into evaluation. One of the drawbacks of the
DREAM method is its vulnerability to meter failure due to the nature
of paired encryption [1]. If one meter fails to collect data at a time point
due to malfunction, DREAM algorithm is unable to generate shared keys,
which leads to failure in encryption. The multiplicative noise method has

superior robustness to technical failure. The absence of a small number
of meter readings within a cluster masked under the multiplicative noise
scheme will cause underestimation of St , but this is not catastrophic.
The electricity suppliers can still form a reasonable makeshift estimate
by simply scaling up the received noisy sum S̃t by a factor nc /(nc − f ),
where nc denotes the number of meters in the cluster, f the number of
‘failed’ or absent meters.
The multiplicative noise method is also flexible in its choice of clustering. Since each individual meter’s measurements are sent independently
of others, clusters may be formed and reformed using these different combinations of dwellings. Any sufficiently large cluster will have comparable
sum estimation accuracy as any other large cluster.

5

Concluding Remarks

Considering the privacy and utility performance, the multiplicative noise
scheme can achieve reasonable individual data privacy and adequately
accurate sum estimation, but it needs careful calibration of masking parameters. The multiplicative noise method is also highly practicable for
smart meters, showing simplicity in application and flexibility in defining
clusters. The main challenge is that it is tricky to achieve an optimal
trade-off of privacy for accurate sum estimation. The Multiplicative algorithm in full generality has great practical merit, but investigation into
the optimal noise distribution M is much needed.
The valuable features of the Twin Uniform distribution are its simplicity and the capacity to eliminate the chance of correctly estimating
the true values through the gap in support about its mean. Such a gap
can be created using other mixture distributions beyond the uniform distribution. Figure 5 provides two possible alternatives, the Twin Triangular distribution and the Twin (Truncated) Exponential distribution. Both
distributions concentrate likelihood more heavily towards the mean of the
distribution, which could have potential benefit of reducing utility loss. It
is of interest to investigate the impacts of these distributions on the value
protection and estimation accuracy both empirically and theoretically.
Another interesting area for further research is choosing the values for
masking parameters. Given that there are several masking parameters in
the multiplicative noise method, an optimisation process can be proposed
in order to maximize accuracy and privacy protection simultaneously. In
addition, parameters are not required to be consistent across the different
clusters, with the only requirement being a consistent mean µM across

Fig. 5: Alternative options for noise distribution.

the family of distributions. By allowing variability of masking parameters
between and within clusters, it is plausible to achieve greater accuracy.
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